
Listen to an interview with John Evans, prior to the Annual ANCA San Francisco Chapter Banquet, held in his honor, on Saturday where he discusses his decision to use the term "Armenian Genocide"
http://podcast.medianext.c
thoughts.elucidations.reflections

As far as the laicist circles, including their friends in the Turkish media, are concerned, ignorance is bliss. They have, of course, never pondered the meaning of modernity, what differences exist between modernity, modernization, contemporariness and so on. They have never heard of multiple modernities. They only talk through their hats about these issues. Thus they view and envy dictators’ wives as modern just because they do not wear headscarves. Diversity, individual freedoms, human rights, democracy and acceptance of the other are all secondary issues compared to appearance and visibility in the Turkish laicist “modernity.”
Speaking about appearance and visibility, we must also look at what other type of headgear could be harming Turkey’s image. Two types of hat come to my mind. One is Demirel’s infamous hat and the other is military hat. And, these two hats are somewhat related to each other. Demirel has long been accused of running away and disappearing with his hat when soldiers showed their hats and staged a coup. Simmering tensions surrounding the visibility of military hats in the civil and political spheres have been an everyday reality of life in Turkey.
Nowadays, we are discussing the new memorandum from the military. Apparently, some soldiers prepared a report about the Turkish media outlets and “media elite,” dividing them mainly into two groups, supporters and opponents. Life is not composed of only black and white, unlike how some of our soldiers would see it. Life is more colorful, sophisticated and complicated, and that is why democracy, freedoms and being able to agree to disagree is a vital need for modern life. And that is precisely why the military should be out of politics. People who are so concerned about Turkey’s image in the West should also worry about the harm done to our image because of what kept happening to Demirel’s hat and because of the visibility of soldiers’ hats in public life. A headscarved lady can and does get respect in Western societies, despite difficulties, but a Turkey with so many appearing and disappearing hats in public is seen as a banana republic, with which one does business but never respects.
Western societies are not monolithic. There is not a monolithic British or English society. They are not all intellectuals or all racist hooligans. Their perceptions of Turkey depend on their backgrounds, education, intellect, ideology, etc. As diaspora Turks experience daily, while there are many Westerners in whose eyes Turks are and will always be the other regardless of what we wear, headscarf or miniskirt, there are also many modern-minded and tolerant folk who see and respect the person behind the appearance. Even though there is no absolute remedy to bigotry and stereotyping, presenting a reality -- and not just a “Potemkin village” image -- of a Turkey where democracy, rule of law, differences and diversity are cherished is essential.

Erdogan's remarks came as he was delivering a keynote speech at the First Forum of the World Azerbaijani and Turkish Diasporas Organizations, in order to counter the intensifying attacks from the Armenian diaspora, which has been striving for international recognition of the so-called Armenian genocide. The congress also intended to prompt Turks and Azeris abroad to take action.
Turkish Cypriot President Mehmet Ali Talat also participated in the forum, which was hosted by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev -- a clear sign of Baku's support for easing international isolation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC).
In his speech, Erdogan called the Nagorno Karabakh dispute "a bleeding wound for the Turkish people," and referred to a December 2006 referendum in the region by Armenia. Ankara has already announced that it will not recognize the outcome of the referendum backing independence in the Nagorno Karabakh region, saying the referendum was held while "ignoring international law."
The first thing is possible statements likely to disturb the equilibrium in domestic policies as well as the stability in politics and economics and the stance of dynamic forces.
Our subject today is the second thing affecting Erdoğan’s decision -- the state of equilibrium within the party and the future of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party). Would Erdoğan want to maintain his influence over AK Party even after he takes office as the president? He definitely would. Can he be successful in doing so? The answer is “no” if we rely on historical evidence. I can hear you recite lines from Mehmet Akif Ersoy, the deceased Turkish poet, who said that history repeats itself. This is what the near past has shown us: when elected president, Turgut Özal handed control of the Motherland Party (ANAP) over to Yıldırım Akbulut, whom Özal thought could be influential within the party and whom Özal later promoted first to the position of interior minister and later to that of parliament speaker. But Akbulut afterward expressed fierce opposition to Özal, although fabricated stories refuted such claims. In a state of panic, Özal clung to Mesut Yılmaz and promoted him to the position of ANAP’s leader after Özal interfered in a general party congress. But he received the last blow from Yılmaz -- even his photographs at the central building of ANAP were removed. He would have attempted to resume his political career along with his brother Yusuf Özal by joining the New Party if he had lived. But he died ahead of his time.
Some made a big mistake when they said: “ANAP was founded at a time that followed a military intervention, and it neither survived the tremor of March 12, 1971, nor was it exposed to the storm of Sept. 12, 1981. The True Path Party, or DYP, a party that Süleyman Demirel founded, is not like any other parties.” Contrary to prior expectations, Tansu Çiller, who joined DYP just a couple of years ago, was promoted as a lay figure to the position of DYP leader, whereas it was the experienced İsmet Sezgin whom Demirel favored at the first party congress. Demirel then would express his disappointment to Necmettin Cevheri, an old friend of his, in words that said, “Necmettin, take this knife from my back.” Although Demirel was formerly comfortable with the course of events, he took his revenge for being stabbed in the back on Feb. 28, 1997. He did not grant the leadership to Çiller and split up the party. A new party was founded under the title of Democratic Turkey Party, or DTP, and because it was assumed that the only difference between DTP and DYP would be one letter, Demirel was relied on to help DTP. But in the end it turned out to be a fiasco.
It is not possible to account for these historical facts by only saying, “The king is dead, then long live the new king.” The idea that is becoming dominant is this: “The leader took office as president, and he already saved his next seven years, however, we will be the ones to account publicly for what we have done. Then we want to have all the instruments to play our song.” All the tools that the party leader has available to himself as someone who wants to set his seal on the party are so strong as to obliterate heartfelt feelings of loyalty to the former party leader. Even though the lists of deputies are prepared altogether at the last minute, it will be the new party leader to have the final say on the allocation of seats after the election. There is this situation where one has to share with five other deputies a room of three square meters at the Parliament. Or there is also the situation where one can have one’s own office at the central building of one’s own party, or at buildings where group or commission meetings are held, and one can always be in the spotlight, accompanied by principal clerks, etc. The president is not entitled at all to any legal or actual rights to put anyone in one of these situations. Therefore, Erdoğan will soon lose his efficiency within the party, just as Özal and Demirel, two charismatic characters, did. Erdoğan is making a mistake if he thinks that he can control his party from his presidential house. The illusion that İstanbul could have been controlled from Ankara should not be forgotten.
Also, there is a need to have a closer analysis of what happened on March 1, 2003, when the government’s proposal to deploy Turkish troops abroad and to allow foreign troops to position in Turkey received disapproval from the parliament. The AK Party leader Erdoğan, who won a crashing victory in the elections, and who gained reception from most senior officials across several famous capitals, could not succeed in earning his 1 March Proposal approval from the Turkish parliament.
There is a high likelihood that possible candidates will run for the leadership of AK Party at the first regular party congress, even if they cannot express their enthusiasm for this position during the election campaign, since Erdoğan still is in control. The factor of Necmettin Erbakan should not also be ignored, because he is waiting to take his revenge on Erdoğan, though he split up his party and pushed it below the election threshold. Those who have not yet taken off their shirt of Milli Görüş, or the National Viewpoint, a movement led by Erbakan, or who keep their shirt of Milli Görüş on the hook in case it may be necessary, can be more easily manipulated in a party that does not include Erdoğan. I guess the prime minister is far more concerned with the state of equilibrium within his party. And he will rest his decision primarily on this.
Access to the popular video-sharing website YouTube has been suspended in Turkey following a court order.Secondly, since the US invasion of Iraq and the founding of a Kurdish autonomous administration there, the Turkish public and establishment (especially the powerful military) have gone into a frenzy under the impression that this initiative will eventually divide Turkey by example. Turkey has three times the Kurdish population of Iraq. Already blamed of having betrayed the strategic partnership between the two countries, the US will be further accused of festering the Armenian problem to no avail except for initiating a sinister plan to divide Turkey. Bizarre as such a statement might seem, this is a wide spread belief in Turkey. So it is most likely that the Armenian resolution will damage current US-Turkish relations at a time when both the Turkish establishment and the public feel besieged at the international arena.
No doubt, a vote that will be held at the US Congress next month will label the predicaments of the Armenians in the last decade of the Ottoman state as “genocide.” This is the name of the worst crime against humanity. Just like the annihilation of the indigenous peoples of the Americas by European invaders/settlers in the name of bringing “civilization” to these savage peoples. That is why the concept of “discovery” was disavowed by the scions of the original people of the Americas. Instead they replaced it with “encounter,” whereby the invaders wiped out the local civilization to replace it with their “superior” one. Not many people try to rally support to pass political judgment from their parliaments for these grand atrocities to accuse the Americans and the Spaniards of today for what the forbearers have done to millions. But then this is the character of politics more than anything else, it feeds on the feelings and interests of the electors and the elected of the day. The Armenian-American community in the US is 1.4 million strong, and it has powerful friends in the establishment, including the new House speaker, Nancy Pelosi among others.
What could the accusation that republican Turkey was an accessory to a crime that transpired before its existence mean? The already high anti-American feelings in Turkey will reach record highs for sure. Secondly, because it is an election year, the incumbent government, which is most likely to be the winner of the next election as well, will bend under public pressure to distance itself from the US. The outcome will be Turkey’s reluctance to support the US in its strategic plans concerning Iraq and Iran. It is no wonder that Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul said the other day, “Turkey will not allow its soil to be used as a launching ground against Iran.” Commentators hint that this may be the beginning of a process that may be followed by denying (or at least restricting) the use of the strategic air base Incirlik in southern Turkey to the Americans, which has played a critical role in all NATO and American operations in the Middle East and Asia (e.g. Afghanistan).
To pass judgment on historical facts that are blurred with today’s political concerns may feel exiting for politicians, especially for the newly elected, who may think that they are morally righteous. But what do they know about the most basic facts of the volatile region where they are caught up presently? Can they distinguish between a Sunni and Shiite Arab and know why they are at odds and the Arabs in general with the Kurds? Their quest to repair the grief of the Armenians is going to inflict a similar wound on the Turkish psyche, which will grow callous to the ultimate need to open up the country to Western standards of democracy and cultural freedoms, which would sooner or later allow a rapprochement in history’s interpretation of what happened between Armenians and Turks. So what seems like a moral initiative by American politicians will be counterproductive. Their role must be to encourage dialogue and reconciliation, not the punishment of one side of the misdeeds of their ancestors four generations ago in return for the spiritual consolation of the other that will have no real consequences in promoting more understanding and empathy. And it is these qualities that are really missing in the shadow boxing between the Turks and the Armenians.