Armenia's Foreign Debt Grows by $192.49 mln to $2.05 bln in 2006

( RIA Novosti ) - Armenia's foreign debt increased by $192.49 million to $2.05 billion in 2006, the country's top statistics body said Tuesday.

Armenia's National Statistics Service said the Armenian government's foreign debt was $1.02 billion, the private sector's liabilities stood at $390.19 million, the debt of monetary authorities amounted to $185.76 million, commercial banks owed $211.01 million and foreign direct investment in the form of loans totaled $244.44 million.

Long-term liabilities accounted for the largest part of Armenia's foreign debt ($1.45 billion or 70.60%), the statistics service said.

Armenia's international assets increased by $307.06 million in 2006, to $1.39 billion as of January 1, 2007, the statistics service said.

Gyumri Mayor Survives Assasination Attempt; 4 Killed

Vardan Gukassyan, the mayor of Armenia's second largest city, Gyumri, was severely injured in the gun attack while four people travelling with him were killed, the prosecutor general's office said in a statement.

Armenia's President Robert Kocharyan met with his security ministers and ordered them to do everything possible to find the attackers, the president's press service said.
Gukassyan had just attended a special session of the ruling Armenian Republican Party's governing council, which agreed to put forward the acting defence minister, Serzh Sarksyan, as the country's new prime minister.

His nomination follows the sudden death from a heart attack last month of Andranik Margaryan.
The mayor, his deputy and their driver were all hospitalised following the late-night attack while three bodyguards in an accompanying vehicle died as they travelled home by road from the capital, Yerevan. The driver later died in hospital.

So far, local authorities have no clear information on who carried out the attack.

The sound of religious footsteps under the bubble of nationalism

ETYEN MAHCUPYAN- Zaman Gazetesi

When nationalism began to permeate the Ottoman Empire, it found itself facing an extremely accommodating base. This was because the Ottoman “millet” system had created protected, public arenas that could be kept closed to the outside and within which religiously “different” communities could maintain their autonomies. Thus nationalism was naturally quickly embraced, particularly in cases where sectarian differences also meant ethnic differences. Two of the large ethnic communities in the Ottoman Empire, the Greeks and the Armenians, never hesitated to embrace nationalism as a basic part of modernization.

As for Ottoman Muslims, rather than immediately occupying the highest spot amongst the hierarchies of the different communities, they went through a long period of indecisiveness, torn between Ottoman-ness, Islamic-ness and Turkish nationalism. As Turkish nationalism began to move step by step toward being the predominant ideology, the elites who defended this stance also came under the influence of the science-based positivism, which was so popular among French intellectuals of the period. In this way, we saw the rise of the idea of Turkishness following 1910, witnessing also the racist nuances added to this ideology through some of its scientific approaches. In short, within the Muslim community of the Ottoman Empire, nationalism first functioned as an ideology which helped “find” and then “reject” the self. To this end, the Kemalist movement first declared Ottoman Muslims were “Turks” in order to create the people of the Republic, and then, in an authoritarian and positivist interpretation of this ideology, turned these same people into “secular” citizens.

This settling in of ideologies, which took place over what was essentially an historically short period of time, deeply affected the Muslims of Turkey. The religiously devout, who gained confidence when facing the West due to the Turkification of their “Muslimness,” were left obliged to turn over their identities to the state as the republic came into being. Following 1980 in particular, there was a “Turkish-Islam synthesis” which aimed to solve the hesitant relationship that existed between the Turkish society and Turkish state. According to proponents of this synthesis, it was only when Islam united as a whole with Turkishness that a historically strong identity would be formed, and that this was the identity necessary to take authority and control over Turkey’s future.

The “socialization” of nationalism had its natural reflection in the political arena. There were many nationalistic parties formed, among them notably the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Grand Unity Party (BBP), and some of these parties still participate in elections. But in the years following 1990, a period emerged which no one had expected: that Turkish Muslims would begin to individualize, would begin to become integrated with modern life according to their own preferences and demands. Just as the level of variety and of varying religious stances expanded within this trend, the political perceptions of the Islamic factions changed in Turkey. Thus the birth of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the ease with which it has found and nurtured support across the country is due to the sociological changes in the background that we have talked about here. Lest this be misunderstood, it is important to clarify that the factor which has worked to alter the mentality of the Islamic factions in Turkey has not been the AK Party itself, but that to the contrary, the mentality which created the AK Party is in itself this very change.

It is not at all surprising that those who today try to block Erdogan’s presidency and single party administration are again embracing nationalism. Because the process that the devoutly religious have gone through in the past 10 years, with the re-separation of the Muslim and Turkish identities, has in a sense brought us back to end of the 19th century. Those who talk about the recent rise in nationalism are actually trying to hide the fact that in Turkey, nationalism has been lost as a candidate to whom the future can be tied. Due to that fact that current polls on the subject are being carried out in an atmosphere which makes it hard for people to say “I am not a nationalist,” there are figures showing hints of a spreading nationalism. But the fact is, under this bubble of nationalism, you can hear the footsteps of modern religious devotees, searching for ever more individuality and freedom.

UN Highlights Human Trafficking

The UN has launched a campaign to highlight human trafficking, an issue it says has reached epidemic proportions over the past decade.

Modern-day slavery affects millions of people around the world, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) said.

Its initiative aims to raise awareness of trafficking both among potential victims and those who buy services or products that rely on slave labor.

The move comes as the UK marks 200 years since its abolition of slavery.

The campaign, entitled The Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking, brings together a raft of UN agencies and NGOs.

At the launch in London, UNODC Executive Director Antonio Costa said that the types of exploitation varied from place to place.

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Armenian Prime Minister Dead

The sudden death of Prime Minister Andranik Markarian on March 25 from heart failure has sparked considerable political unease in Armenia, with residents expressing concern over what implications it could have for parliamentary elections just a month and a half away.

"We have lost a statesman, a colleague, a friend who headed the government for nearly seven years in the 15-and-a-half year history of our independence, and those seven years have been the best years of our state," President Robert Kocharian told cabinet members on March 26, local media outlets reported.

As dictated by the Constitution, the Armenian government resigned on March 26, to be reformed under a new premier. A new prime minister will be appointed within 10 days and a new government will be set up within 20 days. President Kocharian has asked ministers to continue their work until then and directed that Markarian’s funeral be held on March 28, which has been designated as an official day of mourning.

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Controversy over cross grows amid church’s reopening

In advance of the opening of the newly restored Armenian Akhtamar Church on Lake Van, a new controversy has emerged in Ankara over whether or not the church's steeple should have a metal cross placed on it.

Akhtamar Church has undergone restoration that was undertaken at the behest of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Minister of Culture and Tourism Atilla Koc. The church will be reopened to the public at a special ceremony on March 29.

Meanwhile, Patriarch Mesrob II, the spiritual leader of the Armenian Orthodox community in Turkey, has sent a written request to the Culture and Tourism Ministry asking that a cross, prepared by the Armenian Patriarchate itself, be placed on the steeple of the Akhtamar Church. The sentiments in the letter from Partriarch Mesrob are echoed in a similar letter sent by a group of Armenian intellectuals and artists to the ministry.

With no answer yet forthcoming regarding what is to be done about the cross, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism has reportedly sent letters to the Foreign Ministry to obtain further views on the matter. Whether or not the cross will be placed atop Akhtamar Church in advance of the March 29 opening appears to depend on the views on this matter expressed by authorities at the Foreign Ministry.

While the Ministry of Culture and Tourism intends for the 1,100-year-old church on Lake Van's Akhtamar Island to be opened to the public as a "museum," the Armenian community is pressing for the church to be available for religious services. On the subject of the placement of the metal cross atop the church, Patriarch Mesrob references past photographs of the historical church as the reason why the ministry should allow the cross to be placed there.

"A cross can be clearly seen on the steeple of the church in all old photographs of it." The official name of the church also arises in the content of Mesrob's letter, with the patriarch referring to the church as " Lake Van's Agtamar Island Surp Hac Armenian Church."

Within this framework, the Armenian patriarch also suggests that annual September Sacred Cross Festival be called the Agtamar Festival, noting that this would have the additional advantage of drawing local and foreign tourists to the area, with choral groups from Istanbul and folkloric dancers from Van adding to the content of the festival.

The patriarch's letter also focuses on the possible religious services that might take place at Akhtamar Church during the Sacred Cross Festival, explaining, "There could be a religious service in the church's old nave, followed by choral groups and folklore groups."

Patriarch Mesrob's letter ends by noting that he is "praying to dear Allah for the continued success" of the ministry's restoration efforts. In a separate letter on the subject, a group of Armenian intellectuals and artists request that Akhtamar Church, which they refer to as "Ahdamar Church," be turned over permanently to the Armenian community in Turkey. They also note that a cross similar to the one found on the church must be placed there again, and that even if the church is not to be opened for religious services, the cross must still be placed there as a part of restoration efforts.

Oskanian defiant

Representing Armenia at the March 29 opening of the restored Van Lake Akhtamar Church will be Armenia's Deputy Minister of Culture and Youth Affairs Gagik Gurijian.

Speaking Thursday at a press conference, Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian said that Turkey was attempting to influence the international community by holding a public opening of Akhtamar Church. Oskanian also reiterated that in order for relations between the two countries to normalize, Turkey needed to open its borders with Armenia. Akhtamar Church was built by architect Kesis Manuel on the orders of Armenian King Gakik I between AD 915-921. The church has a central dome with four leaf-like wings coming out in a cross shape. It is made of red "tufa" brick.

Is nationalism rising in Turkey?

IHSAN YILMAZ, Zaman Gazetesi

For the last week we have discussed whether nationalism is rising in the country. While some of our intelligentsia are agreed that it is indeed increasing, others have disagreed.
To decide if nationalism is rising in the country or not, one first of all needs to define its meaning. Nationalism has been widely translated to Turkish as “milliyetçilik,” but that is not its precise meaning. The word “millet” (nation) has more religious connotations than it is understood in the West. Islam had been part of the grammar of this society for more than 1,000 years, even as far as the non-Muslims were concerned. The Ottomans had an Islamic legally pluralist system called the millet system, whereby every religious community had regulated their own affairs in the a law realm of private, had their own courts, operated their own schools and so on. Ottoman Muslims, although from very diverse ethnic backgrounds, were nonetheless considered a single millet.

Even after the Ottoman state collapsed, İsmet İnönü successfully argued at the Lausanne Treaty debates that Turks and Kurds were of the same millet. That is why we have many Turkish milliyetçi (nationalist) who are of Kurdish background. One prominent example is the ethnically Kurdish former Health Minister, Osman Durmus of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). This nationalism is not exclusively based on race. It is also a little more than patriotism, as it has certain religious, cultural and ethnic elements. Said Nursi calls this “positive nationalism,” while in his view negative nationalists focus only race, disregarding religious, cultural and historical ties. As far as this type of nationalism (milliyetçilik) is concerned the overwhelming majority of Turks has always been nationalist in this sense and its level cannot be seen as rising.

Today’s fashionable, more secular-type nationalism of “ulusalcilik” exactly matches the term nationalism as used in the sense of the phrase coined by Nursi, “negative nationalism.” I am not sure even this type of nationalism is on the rise either, as it seems that it is not a real grassroots movement, but rather a socially engineered top-down artificial nationalism. This artificial nationalism has no cultural or historical roots in Turkish society and its protagonists are either retired military officers, or else ultra-leftists unhappy with the EU process and the democratization of society. Even though the voice and visibility of these people and their so-called civil society institutions have increased for all sorts of reasons, we cannot say that even ulusalcilik is on the rise, as it is socially artificial.

So what is on the rise? Suspicion of the West, anti-Bushism, anti-EUism. And the reason is the West’s foreign policy. Turks from all walks of life have been rightly suspicious of their allies’ activities in the Middle East, mainly in northern Iraq, and cannot not see why Kurdistan Workers’ Part (PKK) terrorists who cross the border every summer and bomb civilians, including children, are still allowed to reside in northern Iraq and feel heartache in the face of the arrogant and ambiguous attitude of the EU, which has seemingly been enslaved by the Greek Cypriots. Turks are also suspicious that Western governments would not mind a military coup in Turkey, so long as its interests are not prejudiced.

If our Western friends are worried about rising “nationalism” then they should revisit their foreign policy.